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SCHIZOPHRENIA IN TRANSLATION
Clinical Manifestations of Self-disorders and the Gestalt of Schizophrenia
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Anomalies of self-experience (self-disorders) constitute
crucial phenotypes of the schizophrenia spectrum. The
following qualitative study demonstrates a variety of these
core experiential anomalies. From a sample of 36 first-
admitted patients, all of whom underwent a comprehensive
psychiatric evaluation, including the EASE scale (Exami-
nation of Anomalous Self-Experience), 2 schizophrenia
patients were selected for detailed psychopathological
presentation and discussion. The vignettes provide
prototypical examples of what has been termed self-
disorders in schizophrenia, ie, pervasive and enduring
(mainly) trait phenomena which constitute essential aspects
of the spectrum.
Key words: schizophrenia/self/clinical core/experiential
anomalies
Introduction
Anomalies of self-experience (ie, self-disorders) have been
studied as potential schizophrenia spectrum vulnerability
phenotypes.1,2 Although self-disorders were considered
by many classical psychiatrists as intrinsic features of
the clinical picture of schizophrenia (eg, Kraepelin,
Bleuler, Berze, Jaspers, and Schneider), the prominence
of self-disorders and their potential significance has disap-
peared from the current definitions of schizophrenia.3,4
Certain nonpsychotic anomalies of self-experience have
been described as the so-called ‘‘basic symptoms,’’5–7
but self-disorderswere only recently rediscovered in aDan-
ish study of first-admitted schizophrenia spectrum
patients8 and a similar study conducted in Norway.9 A
novel psychometric instrument (Examination of Anoma-
lous Self-Experience [EASE]), descriptively articulating
prototypical examples of single self-disorders10 aids clini-
cians’ inquiries into these pervasive, enduring, and often
alarming experiential disturbances.
Recent empirical studies demonstrate that self-disorders
aggregate selectively in schizophrenia and schizotypy11,12
but not in bipolar disorder.13,14 They occur in genetically
high-risk individuals15 and have been found to be predic-
tive of incident cases of schizophrenia spectrum disorders
in a 5 years follow-up of 155 first-admitted patients.16
The aim of this qualitative study is to illustrate manifes-
tations of self-disorders and how they are similar to and
different from other signs and symptoms of schizophrenia.
We will present 2 illustrative patient vignettes and attempt
to familiarize the readers with concrete examples of the
experiential life of schizophrenia patients.
Methods
The overall sample consisted of 36 first-admitted patients
to Psychiatric Centre Hvidovre (a hospital serving the city
of Copenhagen, with a catchment area of approximately
150 000 inhabitants) between May 2004 and September
2005. Patients with organic brain disorders or severe
substance abuse as a primary or clinically dominating
comorbidity were not included. Aggressive or involun-
tarily admitted patients were not included due to ethical
concerns or because they were unable to undergo the
full examination. The patients underwent a comprehensive
semistructured psychiatric interview, eliciting social and
psychopathological information, performed by a senior
clinician (Dr Jørgen Thalbitzer, a coauthor of the EASE
scale; for study details, see Raballo and Parnas17). The
duration of the interview was between 1.5 and 3–4 h.
The interview comprised a detailed psychosocial history,
illness evolution, the OPCRIT,18 the SCAN,19 and
elements of the PANSS.20
A cornerstone to the evaluation was the EASE scale.10
It covers 5 domains of thematically grouped experiences:
(1) cognition and stream of consciousness, (2) self-
awareness and sense of presence, (3) bodily experiences,
(4) demarcation, and (5) existential reorientation. Among
experienced and trained psychiatrists, the reliability of
EASE has been shown to be good–excellent.21,22 The
patients provided written informed consent and the
relevant medical ethics committee approved the study.
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The research diagnosis followed ICD-10 research criteria:
19 patients with schizophrenia (mean EASE score = 21.4),
8 patients with schizotypal disorder (mean EASE
score = 17.0), and 9 patients outside the schizophrenia
spectrum (mean EASE score = 5.7). The difference be-
tween the spectrum and nonspectrum group was signifi-
cant (Welch’s F = 16.899, P < .001).17 Two patients with
clearly manifest self-disorders and ability to provide de-
tailed descriptions of their experiences were selected for
presentation and discussion. Their EASE scores were sig-
nificantly higher than that of the entire spectrum group.
A description of their flamboyant psychotic symptoms is
left out of this account. Here, we focus on nonpsychotic
anomalies of self-experience. Biographical details have
been modified to protect the patients’ anonymity.
Results
The following vignettes contain prototypical examples of
self-disorders in schizophrenia. Not all reported self-
disorders are included; rather, the focus is on those dom-
inating the clinical picture and causing significant distress.
Case 1
Jane, 22 (EASE score = 40), currently unemployed, is in
a relationship and has a child. She is untrained and has
had changing jobs, which she has been unable to keep.
In particular, jobs that require working with many
colleagues have proven difficult for her. She was admitted
because of increasing isolation, suicidal ideation, and self-
harm. During the previous 18 months, she felt an inexpli-
cable sadness and did not want to live anymore. She felt
empty, unable to feel anything, and everything seemed
meaningless. Already from the age of 4 she felt profoundly
different from others. She rarely played with other
children, since they made her nervous and insecure, and
she never invited them home because their presence was
felt as deeply intrusive—‘‘they would come too close to
me.’’ At puberty, her feelings of being different intensified
and she felt as if she was an extraterrestrial. She often
withdrew to her room, and the frustration and anger of
not being able to be around others led to episodes of
self-harm and suicide-attempts.
She stated that she had no idea who she was (I am like
a puzzle with a piece missing). She described persistent
experiences of not being fully present in the world and
of a diminished transparency of consciousness: ‘‘It feels
as if I am sleeping with my eyes open. It feels unreal as
if everything happens in slow-motion.’’ She feels that
she does not truly perceive the world and that she is not
really a part of it—as if there is a veil between her and
the world outside. Frequently, she experiences the world
as strange or meaningless. Objects may acquire an intru-
sive quality, in particular portrait photographs, which she
always feels are watching her. She described alterations of
the first-person perspective, eg, she has the impression of
perceiving everything ‘‘through’’ her head, ‘‘from a point
located at the back of my head, as if my eyes were placed
there.’’
The patient’s most incessant complaint was that inter-
personal contact is unbearable. This social anxiety seems
associated with her ongoing experience of not knowing
who she is and not feeling truly present (existing) in the
shared world. Rather than being smoothly participating,
she perceivesworldly activities from afar (as a train rushing
by). This felt distance includes a decreased ability to be
affected and touched by others, as well as a diminished
capacity to act. She feels that she is ‘‘not truly noticed
or heard’’ by others, and this, she claims, is the true source
of her loneliness. The distance she experiences toward the
world may be accompanied by an altered visual perspec-
tive: ‘‘It’s as if I shrink or the room I’m in enlarges and the
distance to the walls increases.’’ Moreover, she has the im-
pression as if she is the only one who really exists and is
‘‘responsible for the world moving on.’’ She manifests
a sense of superiority over her fellow humans, eg, she per-
ceives others as ‘‘robot-like,’’ ‘‘empty shells,’’ or ‘‘extras’’
in her life, and she finds it nearly impossible to image that
they actually have a life of their own. She also has the im-
pression as if her own experiential field is all that exists (If I
perceive a door and then look away, then it’s almost as if
the door ceases to exist). These quasi-solipsistic experiences
reflect her feeling of being a unique subject in the world,
but as often seen in cases of schizophrenia, this feeling of
solipsistic grandiosity is both fragile and paradoxical.23
Although she regards herself as superior to others, she
has simultaneously no idea who she herself is (I might
as well have been a dog). She feels alienated from her
body and finds it disconnected from her mind. Finally,
she reports enduring problems in the sense of personal de-
marcation and privacy of thoughts, as if the others can see
through her (they can see allmy horrible thoughts and they
know everything about me).
Moreover, Jane has perceptual disturbances, visual
and auditory hallucinations, and persistent persecutory
delusions. She is diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.
Case 2
Peter, 18 (EASE score = 37), is a high school dropout,
working part-time as a phone salesman and living with
a roommate. Throughout his life he has had only one
friend at a time. He was admitted because of suicidal ide-
ation. He describes a sense of inner change occurring
around puberty, accompanied by an awareness of being
radically different: ‘‘I feel like I don’t belong here, like
there is no place for me among others.’’ He has feelings
of not being fully present: ‘‘It’s as if I’m inside a glass
dome’’; ‘‘I don’t truly feel the world, because I don’t
feel anything inside.’’ Most of the time, he feels ‘‘as if
sleepwalking’’: ‘‘everything seems so far away as if there
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is an invisible wall I cannot penetrate.’’ He refers to his
world as a ‘‘dream world’’ and himself as a ‘‘zombie,’’ ‘‘a
shell devoid of emotions.’’ He describes an inner division
(I-split), in which 2 parts are fighting for domination,
pulling in opposite directions: a good, cheerful part,
sensitive to beauty, and a bad part, filled with anger,
resentment, and sadness. This sense of I-split undermines
his fragile sense of identity (I feel like my body is housing
an ongoing power-struggle. There is something alien
about it. I don’t feel present at all). When dominated
by thoughts of his bad part, everything becomes mean-
ingless (it’s unimportant to take a shower because
nothing matters anymore) and then he has to reflect
intensely in order to arrive at somemeaning (seeing some-
thing outside my window, I must say to myself ‘now
that’s beautiful’, otherwise it’s meaningless).
The patient’s experiences are permeated by I-split and
a diminished sense of existing as an embodied subject fully
present to the world (I live in my own universe). This lack
of immersion and a failing sense of self-presence are asso-
ciated with multiple cognitive disturbances: uncontrolla-
ble, unconnected thoughts, usually with trivial or
neutral content, interfere with his main line of thinking.
He experiences how these thoughts almost physically enter
one side of his head and exit the other. He hears his
thoughts spoken aloud with his own voice inside his
head.He avoidsmirrors because his face appears somehow
altered. He feels as if his body isn’t his own and his ‘‘brain
is totally disconnected’’ from his body. This split is asso-
ciated with experiences of motor disturbances: ‘‘My arms
feel so heavy that I barely can lift them. Also, my hands
don’t really do what I want them to do. When I wash my
hair, the washing is somehow blurred, as if I myself can’t
keep upwithmymovements.’’ His sense of disembodiment
and loss of control of bodily movements initially led to the
formation of vague ideas about external influence (it some-
times feels as if someone else is performing my actions. It’s
as if it’s not me. I feel like a puppet), which he eventually
explained through clear delusions.
He was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
because of bizarre delusions, delusions of control, and
commenting hallucinatory voices.
Note that both patients, through phrasings such as ‘‘it
feels like. ’’ or the conditional ‘‘as if,’’ mainly indicate
alterations in subjective experiences rather than well-
articulated psychotic errors of judgement (delusions or
hallucinations).
Discussion
Self-disorders are not sharply delimited independent symp-
toms but are perhaps best conceived as mutually implica-
tive, interdependent aspects of a more comprehensive
Gestalt. The relation of the Gestalt to its manifestations
is reciprocal: the Gestalt confers certain typicality on its
constituents or parts while the latter infuse the Gestalt
with a concrete clinical rootedness. The individual features
bear an imprint of a more global experiential alteration.
This global alteration transpires through the patients’ of-
ten diverse anomalous experiences, shaping them, and
keeping them to some extent interrelated. The Gestalt is
not an imagined or inferred construct but is perceivable
in the ways consciousness operates, ie, the Gestalt appears
in ‘‘how’’ the patients experience themselves, others, and
the world, and not merely in ‘‘what’’ they experience.
Many psychopathologists considered the diagnosis of
schizophrenia irreducible to single symptoms or signs,
but only graspable as a characteristic Gestalt,3 a trait-
condition, involving profound structural alterations of
consciousness.24 Empirical studies, referred to in the intro-
duction, have documented that self-disorders are highly
indicative of schizophrenia spectrum conditions.11–16 We
consider self-disorders to constitute crucial aspects of the
psychopathological Gestalt of schizophrenia. Yet, the spec-
ificity of this Gestalt is irreducible to a quantitative sum of
anomalous experiences. Rather, we believe that certain
aspects are more essential than others. These reflect distur-
bances of self-awareness, in particular, waning first-person
perspective, diminished self-presence and innermost
identity, feelings of not belonging to the world, of pro-
found difference from others, fuzzy self-demarcation,
hyperreflexivity (ie, exaggerated and alienating forms
of self-consciousness that involve distortions of the normal
structures of awareness such as foreground–background,
explicit–implicit, and focal–tacit, thereby enabling usu-
ally implicit aspects of, say, one’s body or inner life to
be experienced in a strangely explicit and self-alienating
way),1 thought pressure or block, spatialization of mental
states (ie, thoughts, feelings, or other mental processes
acquire properties not completely unlike physical objects
and thoughts, eg, may be experienced as located to a par-
ticular part of the brain or with acoustic or auditory qual-
ities), perplexity, and quasi-solipsistic experiences. The
patients’ psychosocial histories exemplify that self-disorders
usually are pervasive, enduring trait-phenomena, typi-
cally dating back to childhood or early adolescence,
and contributing to distress and dysfunction.
As the empirical studies also attest, patients from other
diagnostic groups occasionally report self-disorders (eg,
patients with depression, melancholia, or severe person-
ality disorders). In these cases, however, the complaints
do not, in our view, reflect the altered structure of sub-
jectivity24 but concernmore complex, narrative aspects of
selfhood. Yet, a further specification of the precise nature
of the schizophreniaGestalt will require relevant compar-
isons with other psychopathological Gestalts.
The concept of self-disorders may represent a step for-
ward in grasping the essential aspects of the psychopathol-
ogy of schizophrenia. First, it may have a transformative
potential for the validity of the concept of the schizophre-
nia spectrum, eg, sharpening its distinction from affective
illness. Second, a corollary of such diagnostic reemphasis
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may enable more accurate and earlier identification of
at-risk mental states tagged with a propensity to unfold
intomanifest schizophrenia or schizotypal disorder. Third,
familiarity with self-disorders sensitizes clinicians to the
disturbing, pervasive anomalies of experience of their
patients, thus paving a path for better-informed therapeu-
tic approaches. Finally, a focus on this particular pheno-
type may have a unique value in the search for
neurobiological correlates of the illness. In this context,
self-disorders are probably more proximate to the causally
implicated mechanisms than the developmentally complex
positive and negative symptoms.
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